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Randolph proposed the Virginia plan at the third
session of the Federal Convention, it contained the only
sound and workable principle by which the powers of nation and
states could be divided. It was couched in these words: . . . "the
national legislature ought to be empowered . . . to legislate in all
cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
exercise of individual legislation."' This was the statement of a
principle and not the description of a method; it declared the object for which national powers were to be conferred rather than
the precise mechanism by which the delegation was to be made. In
the ensuing debates it appears that this broad statement correctly
expressed the basic intention of the convention, although it was
fairly promptly suggested that the object so described might better
be achieved through the enumeration of specific powers to be
given to the new national government. The convention itself did
not attempt to formulate this enumeration of national powers.
On July 26th the principles upon which agreement had been
reached during more than two months of debate were confided to
a committee of detail with instructions to "prepare and report a
constitution conformable thereto." And the instruction given to
the committee of detail with respect to national powers was that:
"The national legislature ought to possess the legislative rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation; and, moreover, to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also
in those to which the states are separately incompetent, or in which
HEN
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the harmony2' of the United States may be interrupted by individual
legislation.

It was the committee of detail which translated the broad
principle of national legislative authority into the concrete enumeration of powers embodied in article I, section 8 of the constitution
as finally adopted.
The delegated powers of Congress, therefore, were not conferred in a miserly spirit nor with a niggardly hand. They were
given to serve the broad purpose of Randolph's original resolution. No power then deemed necessary for the "general interests
of the Union," for the exercise of which "the several states are
incompetent," or in respect of which the "harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by individual legislation" was withheld from the new national legislature. If in the future new and
different powers, not then identified, should be needed for the
promotion of the national interest, such powers could be conferred
by the process of constitutional amendment carefully outlined in
article V. But there were no conscious omissions. The delegated
powers were merely the concrete embodiment in terms of the
political experience of the eighteenth century of the principle that
the new national government was to have the powers necessary
to deal with all truly national problems.
The delegated powers of Congress do not include a broad and
undefined authority to legislate for the national welfare. There
is, in short, no independent national police power as such. If
Congress is to deal directly and effectively with the problems of
national import which may be deemed to inhere in the field of
marriage and divorce control, or in the punishment of those who
participate in lynchings, it must secure the authority to do so by
constitutional amendment. The emergence of a national problem
does not automatically generate national power to solve it. But
if we define the national police power to be the use by the federal
government of its clearly delegated powers for the broad purposes
of national social and economic welfare, we are then considering
a power not only necessary and desirable in dealing with the
nation's problems, but also one lying within the scope of the
purposes for which powers were delegated to Congress by the
statesmen who built our constitutional system. For this is merely
to say that the power to tax, to regulate commerce, or to set up
22
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postal regulations, powers given to Congress in order that it
might "legislate for the general interests of the Union, and also
in those to which the states are separately incompetent, or in which
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted," may be
used by Congress for the broad national purposes for which they
were thus conferred. By such national police power Congress
may deal, with varying degrees of effectiveness, with any truly
national problem which emerges within the range and sweep of
the plenary powers enumerated in article I, section 8.
Nor should we feel that we are guilty of disloyalty to the
fundamental principles of the founding fathers because the national purposes for which Congress uses its national powers in
1934 differ concretely from those which were or could have been
envisaged by Randolph, Wilson or Gouverneur Morris. Those
statesmen would have been the last to lay the strangling grip of
the hand of the dead upon the normal development, expansion,
and effective use of the national powers so generously conferred.
To argue solemnly whether the men who drafted our constitution
actually intended that Congress should use its power over interstate commerce to discourage the white slave traffic, or should use
its power of taxation to prevent the sale of narcotic drugs, is to
speculate about propositions the terms of which cannot possibly
have any reality, and which strongly suggest the colloquy in the
old play:
"Does your brother like cheese?"
"I have no brother."
"Well, if you had a brother, would he like cheese?"
All that we need to know is that the Convention of 1787 expected Congress to use its national powers for national purposes,
and that that was the object that it had in conferring those powers.
The development of a national police power based on the
theory of national powers for national purposes has, of course,
not escaped criticism and attack. It aroused the bitter opposition
of the strict-constructionist who believed that the powers of Congress should be rigidly construed as to content and even more
severely limited as to the purposes for which they might be employed. It alarmed the ardent defender of states' rights who
saw an expanding federal power penetrating some of the traditional fields of state authority. It has, however, been unquestioningly accepted by the public opinion of the country as a necessary
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and desirable type of federal power; it has been employed by
Congress with increasing freedom and eagerness to deal with
newly emerging national problems; and it has received the
acquiescence and recognition of the Supreme Court. In short,
the national police power-the power of Congress to use its
delegated authority for the protection and promotion of the social
and economic welfare of the nation-is a recognized part of our
present constitutional system.
There are three of the delegated powers of Congress which
have served as the basis for practically all of the national police
power which has thus far been exercised. These are the commerce power, the postal power, and the power of taxation.3 The
broad economic policies embodied in the recovery legislation must
find their ultimate constitutional sanction in the power of Congress
to regulate commerce. The "New Deal" program exemplifies
strikingly the employment of a delegated power-the commerce
power-for the broad purposes of national social and economic
welfare. While there has been no recent utilization of the postal
power for police purposes of a new variety, the continued vitality
of the legislation barring obscene literature from the mails and
penalizing the use of the mails to defraud is a reminder that social
purposes are still being achieved through the use of that particular
delegated authority. Social and economic policies are expressed
with varying degrees of articulateness ii every major taxing
statute passed by Congress; but the recently enacted statute enforcing a federal restriction upon cotton production by imposing
a fifty per cent tax upon cotton produced in excess of quota indicates that Congress has not forgotten that national economic
problems may be dealt with by regulatory or destructive taxation.
It is the purpose of this paper to study the national police
power which has grown up under the taxing power of Congress,
with special emphasis upon the more recent manifestations of that
power. This will involve an analysis and classification of the
techniques which Congress has employed in using the taxing power
as an implement of social and economic control. It will further
3

In 1919 and 1920 the present writer published in the pages of the
an elaborate study of the police power of the
national government as follows: The National Police Power under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, (1919) 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVImw
289, 381, 452; The National Police Power under the Taxing Clause of
the Constitution, (1920) 4 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 247; The National
Police Power under the Postal Clause of the Constitution, (1920) 4 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 402.
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involve a study of the judicial doctrines upon the basis of which,
with the aid of which, or under the limitations of which this type
of national police power has been evolved. In fact these judicial
doctrines as to the nature and outside limits of the federal taxing
power may well serve as the major headings of this discussion.
Proceeding from the simple and obvious to the more complex and
controversial we may survey the development of a national police
power under the taxing clause by considering in turn the nature
and practical results of the following propositions.
1. TIe Rate of Lawful Taxation Rests in the Discretion of
Congress. It may be regarded as axiomatic that a tax, otherwise
lawfully levied, does not become unconstitutional merely because
it is unduly burdensome. There is no constitutional limit upon
the rate of taxation. Perhaps the best known epigram in the
literature of constitutional law is Marshall's dictum in McCulloch
v. MAaryland,4 "The power to tax involves the power to destroy."
It announces a doctrine which has been followed with approval
in hundreds of cases state and federal. That doctrine was stated
with more elaborate precision by Chief Justice Chase in the case
of Veagie Bank v. Fenno.5 He said:
"The power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts
but to the people by whom its members are elected. So if a particular tax bears heavily upon corporations, or a class of corporations, it cannot, for that reason only, be pronounced contrary to the
constitutibn."
The rule rests upon considerations of obvious soundness and
necessity. The power to tax is one of the vital attributes of a
sovereign government. No one but the legislature can measure
the fiscal needs of the nation. National emergencies may demand
that the government impose tax burdens upon its citizens which
approach confiscation. The way must be left open for the levying of taxes sufficient for the public needs. Furthermore, if the
courts are to judge the validity of taxes by their rates, what
measure of validity is to be applied? How can a court declare
a tax to be void because it is too high without subjecting to
judicial scrutiny all the many and diverse considerations of public
policy and necessity which are the very essense of the legislative
function? The courts have wisely refused to assume any such
non-judicial duty, and the result is that, assuming that there is no
4(1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
5(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 533, 19 L. Ed. 482.
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other constitutional objection to it, a tax is valid even though its
rate rises to a thousand per cent or more.
2. Taxation Need Not Be for Revenue Only. The most obvious
and normal purpose and effect of taxation is to raise revenue.
But it is equally true that this is not its only legitimate purpose
and effect. The legislature may properly use the power of taxation not merely to raise funds but also to accomplish incidental
regulatory results; and the tax is not unconstitutional because
of the presence of that incidental purpose and the accomplishment
of those incidental results. It is unnecessary to deal here with
the arguments of the strict constructionists who have so persistently and bitterly contended that taxes may be validly levied only to
raise money, except to state that their arguments have not prevailed either with Congress or with the Supreme Court.
In the first place, incidental regulation and control is inherently and inextricably bound up with any exercise of the taxing
power. It would be impossible for Congress to levy a tax which
did not have social and economic consequences of a non-fiscal
character. Taxation means burden; freedom from taxation means
freedom from burden. The selection by Congress of the persons
and things and transactions which shall bear or escape that burden
necessitates the formulation of a regulatory policy affecting the
social and economic life of the nation, a function supplementary
to but different from the mere job of filling the national treasury.
In the levying of every tax Congress must inevitably have a
purpose other than the raising of revenue since it cannot escape
the responsibility of controlling in the national interest the nonfiscal regulatory effects of its distribution of tax burdens. There
can, in short, be no such thing as taxation for revenue only.
In the second place, Congress throughout our national history
has frankly assumed that responsibility. It has formulated its
policies of taxation with one eye on the federal treasury and the
other upon the problems of protecting domestic industries, or
discouraging the importation, production or consumption of questionable or objectionable commodities. Even before the constitution was ratified, Hamilton had pointed out in the "Federalist"
the social consequences of federal taxation. After suggesting that
a tax of one shilling per gallon on "ardent spirits" would produce
an annual federal revenue of two hundred thousand pounds he
goes on to say:
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"That article would well bear this rate of duty; and if it
should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect
would be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to
the morals, and to the health of society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of national extravagance, as this very
article."6
Congress followed Hamilton's advice in the heavy taxation of
liquor; and it also embarked under his leadership upon our national policy of protective tariffs. By the juggling of tariff rates
it has not merely raised revenue to pay the nation's bills, but it
has stimulated many of our industries just as effectively as, by
the selection of the objects of certain of its internal revenue taxes,
it has discouraged or destroyed certain other industries. And it
is interesting to reflect upon the fact that if Congress, unfettered
by the archaic requirement of apportionment of direct taxes, could
embark upon a policy of land taxation founded upon the principles
of Henry George it would not only raise revenue for national
purposes, but it would accomplish social and economic results so
revolutionary in character as to fill the soul of the modern real
estate speculator with paralytic horror. It is clear that Congress
can never escape the obligation to pay fully as much attention to
the social consequences of the way in which it raises the federal
revenue as to the problem of seeing that that revenue is adequate.
Finally, the Supreme Court has placed the seal of its approval
upon the doctrine that taxation need not be for revenue only. It
recognizes that social and economic results will attend the raising
of national revenue; and it concedes that a sound policy as to
the nature of those results may properly control the selection by
Congress of the subjects of taxation. The Court's position is
made clear by Chief Justice Taft in his opinion in Hampton and
Co. v. United States7 upholding the constitutionality of the protective tariff. He said:
"So long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the general
government, the existence of other motives in the selection of the
subjects of taxes cannot invalidate congressional action. As we
said in the Child Labor Tax Case.... :
"'Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the
Legislature on proper subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental motive of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They do
6

The Federalist, No. 12.
7(1928) 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624.
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not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental motive.'
"And so here the fact that Congress declares that one of its
motives in fixing the rates of duty is so to fix them that they shall
encourage the industries of this country in the competition with
producers in other countries in the sale of goods in this country
cannot invalidate a revenue act so framed."
3. Regulatory and Destructive Taxation May Be Used to Aid
Congress in the Exercise of Its Other Delegated Powers. Thus
far we have been dealing with taxes designed clearly, perhaps
primarily, for revenue, but calculated also to promote certain
social or economic policies. From the point of view of constitutionality the revenue purpose pays the way of whatever goes
along with it in the form of regulation or social control. We
turn now to a group of taxes in which the legislative purpose as
well as the practical result is primarily or exclusively to regulate
or destroy the thing taxed and there is no serious expectation or
desire to raise revenue. The line dividing these groups of taxing
measures may not be clear or easy to draw; but the line is there
and there can be no doubt that Congress has frequently crossed
it. When Congress has crossed the line and has used its taxing
power not to raise money but to regulate and destroy, has it exceeded its constitutional authority? The answer to this question
is complicated and difficult. The latter part of this article will
be devoted to its more controversial phases. But one aspect of
the problem has been clearly and conclusively settled. Congress
may use its taxation power primarily or even exclusively for
purposes of regulation or destruction when to do so will aid it in
regulating commerce, controlling the currency or exercising any
other power delegated to it by the constitution. Regulatory cr
destructive taxation may properly be used as a means of doing
anything falling within the delegated powers of Congress.
This seems too obvious to require extensive comment. Congress has used destructive taxation in aid of its commerce power
and its currency power, and in each case the Supreme Court has
given its approval. In 1866 Congress levied a tax of ten per cent
upon state bank notes in order to protect the notes of the new
national banks from competition. 8 The tax was, of course, destructive and was intended to be so. In Veazie Bank v. Fenno"
the Supreme Court upheld this tax. In the course of its opinion
8Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 146.
9(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 533, 19 L. Ed. 482.

CONTROL THROUGH FEDERAL TAXATION

it pointed out that Congress enjoys the power of providing an
adequate national currency for the nation. To accomplish this
Congress "may restrain by suitable enactments, the circulation as
money of any notes not issued under its own authority ...
Viewed in this light....
we cannot doubt the constitutionality of
the tax under consideration." In other words, the destructive ten
per cent tax was merely an indirect but wholly proper method of
doing what Congress, under its currency power, c6uld have done
by direct prohibition.
The question of the constitutionality of the protective tariff
has long bothered many people, particularly Democrats.' 0 To be
genuinely protective a tariff should completely bar importations,
and if it did so of course it produced no revenue. Tariff rates
have been known to rise as high as twelve hundred per cent. The
Supreme Court never passed squarely on the validity of protective
tariffs until the case of Hampton and Co. v. United States' was
decided in 1928. In that case, as we have already seen,' 2 the
Court sustained the tariff on the ground that the regulatory and
protective elements were incidental to the collection of revenue.
In 1933, however, the Court found it convenient to abandon the
theory that tariffs are taxes and to announce that they are instead
regulations of foreign commerce.' 3 The University of Illinois
had imported scientific apparatus for laboratory use, clearly a state
governmental function. It objected to the payment of tariff duties
on these imports on the ground that they were federal taxes on
state instrumentalities forbidden by the doctrine of the duality of
the federal system as embodied in Collectorv. Day.'4 If the duties
were taxes, there seemed no escape from the state's contention.
Escape lay in holding that the duties were not taxes but were
rather exercises of the power to regulate foreign commerce, a
power to which the doctrine of the duality of the federal system,
for reasons made none too clear, does not apply. Since tariffs,
therefore, are not exercises of the taxing power, even though they
'OThe platform on which President Wilson was elected in 1912 contained the following provision: "We declare it to be a fundamental prin-

ciple of the Democratic Party that the federal government under the constitution has no right to impose or collect tariff duties except for the purposes of revenue ... "

21(1928) 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624.

1"Supra, p. 765.
' 3 University of Illinois v. United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 48, 53 Sup.

Ct. 509, 77 L. Ed. 1025.

14(1871) 11 Wall. (U.S.)

113, 20 L. Ed. 122.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

'levy duties, there is no occasion of course to be disturbed over
the fact that their primary purpose and effect may have little to
do with the producing of revenue.
It seems clear that the destructive tax of fifty per cent imposed
by the recently enacted Bankhead Cotton Control Act" upon
the sale of all cotton in excess of the quotas set up in the statute
rests upon the principle just discussed. If the act as a whole is
constitutional, a point still undecided, it is because it is a legitimate
exercise by Congress of its power over foreign and interstate
commerce. The purpose to regulate such commerce is plainly
declared in the title of the statute, and is explained still more fully
in the elaborate "declaration of policy" at the beginning of the
act. The destructive tax is, therefore, merely part of the machinery employed to control foreign and interstate trade in cotton.
Its repressive or destructive consequences raise no separate constitutional problems since the underlying assumption of the entire
statute is that those repressive or destructive consequences could
properly be achieved by direct exercise of the commerce power.
Destructive taxation, in other words, is always available as a
means of carrying out any delegated federal power.
It must be noted, however, that the cases we have been considering do not afford direct support for the proposition that the
federal taxing power may be used for purposes other than the
raising of revenue. There is no sensible reason why one delegated
power may not constitutionally be used to aid the exercise of
another delegated power; and the Supreme Court has never denied
the possibility. It has, however, preferred a different theory and
has very carefully made clear that a tax levied as an aid in the
regulation of commerce is not really a tax but a commercial
regulation; it is not an exercise of the federal power of taxation
but of the commerce power. This was sharply brought out in
University of Illinois v. United States'6 where it was necessary to
hold that tariffs were regulations of commerce and not exercises
of the taxing power, in order to avoid overruling or weakening
the long line of decisions forbidding the federal taxation of state
instrumentalities.
4. Federal Police Power May Be Validly Derived from Regulations Incidental to the Imposition of Excises. Congress has
15Act of April 20, 1934.
16(1933) 289 U. S. 48, 53 Sup. Ct. 509, 77 L. Ed. 1025.
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exercised a police power under the taxing clause which employs
a wholly different technique from that thus far considered. Since
the constitutionality of these police regulations has been uniformly
sustained, we may dispose of the topic before passing on to more
highly controversial problems. In this group of cases Congress
has controlled social and economic policy not by imposing burdensome or destructive tax rates, but by the establishment of separate
regulations ostensibly forming part of the administrative machinery designed to facilitate or protect the collection of the tax.
These regulations are wholly independent of the rate of taxation.
Some of these police regulations are far less significant than
the potentialities which inhere in the method used. The Dingley
Tariff Act of 189717 contained a provision forbidding the inclusion
in packages of tobacco or cigarettes subject to excise anything
except the tobacco or cigarettes, and then went on to provide, "nor
shall there be affixed thereto, or branded, stamped, marked, written
or printed upon, said packages or their contents any promise or offer of, or any order or certificate for, any gift, prize, premium, pay8
ment, or reward." In Felsenheld v. United States"
the Supreme
Court upheld the power of Congress to impose this regulation.
Premium coupons had been included in packages of tobacco.. It
was admitted by the government that "the coupon is printed on
thin paper of inappreciable weight, without intrinsic value, and
does not affect in any way the ascertaining of the proper tax payable upon the package, or interfere in any way with the collection
of such tax." Mr. Justice Brewer's opinion declares that Congress
assumes, or may constitutionally assume, responsibility for assuring the buying public that packages of excised goods contain the
goods which under the law they purport to contain, and not other
goods. He said:
"Take the matter of tobacco; can it be that a manufacturer
may fill packages purporting to be of tobacco with half tobacco
and half sawdust, and the government can pass no valid statute
to prevent it? If the manufacturer is willing to pay a full tobacco
tax on this package, half tobacco and half sawdust, must the government take the money, affix its stamp, and thus in effect certify
that the contents are that which it has imposed a tax upon? . . .
It is one thing to say that the government's stamp is not a
guaranty of either quantity or quality, and that no liability attaches
to it if the manufacturer imposes upon his customers by inserting
17Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. at L. 151.
1$(1902) 186 U. S. 126, 22 Sup. Ct. 740, 46 L. Ed. 1085.
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something which is not that which is stamped, but it is a very
different thing to hold that the government is absolutely powerless
to legislate so as to protect the customer and prevent the manufacturer from putting within the package anything but the article
which it proposes to tax ...
"It seems to us that, in the rules and regulations for the manufacture and handling of goods which are subjected to an internal
revenue tax, Congress may prescribe any rule or regulation which
is not in itself unreasonable; that it is a perfectly reasonable
requirement that every package of such goods should contain
nothing but the article which is taxed; that in order to make such
a regulation constitutional it is not necessary that there be, either
expressly or by implication, an exception of those articles or
things which by virtue of their minute size or weight do not
apparently affect the collection of the tax."
Congress has made little use of the authority which Mr. Justice
Brewer here indicates that it has. Besides the premium coupon
regulation it has added one other minor provision forbidding the
inclusion in packages of excised tobacco or cigarettes of lottery
tickets, obscene pictures or writing."9 No one saw fit to question
the validity of this regulation. But it seems clear from the theory
of the Felsenheld Case that Congress, by ancillary regulations attached to its excise power, could accomplish everything in the way
of social policy that has been achieved under the Pure Food and
Drugs Acts and do it more thoroughly. In levying an excise tax
Congress carefully defines and describes the article upon which the
tax is to fall. This may include obviously minute details as to
quantity, quality, standards of purity, and honesty of representation. The law may then forbid under heavy penalty the sale under
the government tax stamp of any article or commodity not conforming to the prescribed standards. And since all commodities
produced or sold in the United States may be subjected to federal
taxation, the protective regulations thus set up are not limited in
their application, as at present, to articles which move through the
channels of interstate commerce. The compulsory registration
under federal law of all trademarks in order to impose an excise
tax upon them would give Congress the right, under the doctrine
here set forth, to penalize the use of trademarks not so registered,
or the use of them in violation of regulations set up to prevent
their infringement. It is obvious that there is a vast reservoir
IOU. S. Code, 1926, Title 26, Sec. 838, p. 800, 26 U. C. A. sec. 838, 3
Mason's ,U. S. Code, tit. 26, sec. 838.
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of federal police power latent in this method of using the taxing
power.
An analogous, and even more drastic, type of social control
has been exercised by Congress under the taxing power as directed
against the sale of narcotic drugs. Both the technique and the
theory of this legislation are slightly different from that just
discussed. The Harrison Act of 191420 required all persons importing, manufacturing, selling or giving away narcotic drugs to
register with the collector of internal revenue and pay a tax of
one dollar per year. The sale or dispensing of the drugs could
be lawfullji made only upon written orders made out by purchasers
upon blanks provided by the commissioner of internal revenue,
copies of which must be kept for public inspection for two years.
Separate rules applied to physicians and dentists who were, nevertheless, required to keep elaborate records of drugs dispensed,
and it was further made unlawful to secure the drugs save for
use in a lawful business or the legitimate practice of one's profession. Violations of the act were punishable by a fine of not
more than $2,000, imprisonment for five years, or both. It was
perfectly apparent that this whole elaborate structure of drastic
control of the drug traffic rested constitutionally upon the relatively microscopic interest which the government had in collecting
a dollar a year from those registered under the law. The act was
held valid, however, in Doremus v. United States21 in a five-tofour decision. Doremus, a physician, had paid the tax but dispensed large quantities of heroin to an addict without complying
with the other regulations of the act. Mr. Justice Day, speaking
for the Court, addressed himself to the question, "have the provisions in question any relation to the raising of revenue ?" Undoubtedly well aware that Congress was here making the cart pull
the horse he solemnly announced:
"Congress, with full power over the subject, short of arbitrary
and unreasonable action, which is not to be assumed, inserted these
provisions in an act specifically providing for the raising of
revenue. Considered of themselves, we think they tend to keep
the traffic above-board and subject to inspection by those authorized to collect the revenue. They tend to diminish the opportunity
of unauthorized persons to obtain the drugs and sell them clandestinely without paying the tax imposed by the federal law. ...
Congress may have deemed it wise to prevent such possible dealings because of their effect upon the collection of the revenue."
2
OAct of Dec. 17, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 785.
21(1919) 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214, 63 L. Ed. 493.
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Chief Justice White, with three justices concurring, dissented
without formal opinion, contenting himself with the brief
comment:
"the court below correctly held the act of Congress, in so
far as it embraced the matters complained of, to be beyond the
constitutional power of Congress to enact because to such extent
the statute was a mere attempt by Congress to exert a power not
delegated; that is, the reserved police power of the states."
The subsequent history of the narcotic legislation before the
courts is not without interest. In 1925 the case of Linder v.
United States22 was decided. Linder, a physician, had been indicted
under the Harrison Act for having prescribed in the ordinary
course of his professional practice four doses of narcotic drugs
to an addict to be self-administered, the prescription being made
without the written application on the government's forms which
is required by law. In a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice
McReynolds, who had dissented in the Doremus Case,21 the Court
held that the statute could not be validly construed to forbid
Linder's act. The specific requirement which he had violated had
no reasonable relationship to the efficient collection of the revenue.
The Doremus Case was not overruled, but "the sharp division of
the Court in this cause," said Mr. Justice McReynolds, required
that the narcotic act "be strictly construed and not extended beyond
the proper limits of a revenue measure." The opinion further
declares:
"Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated
power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted
to the federal government. And we accept as established doctrine
that any provision of an act of Congress ostensibly enacted under
power granted by the constitution, not naturally and reasonably
adapted to the effective exercise of such power, but solely to the
achievement of something plainly within power reserved to the
states, is invalid and cannot be enforced."
Mr. Justice McReynolds was still not satisfied. In 1926 the
case of Uivited States v. Daugherty24 raised the question of the
legality of a criminal sentence imposed under the Harrison Act.
In his opinion disposing of this technical point Mr. Justice McReynolds interjected, quite gratuitously and apropos of nothing
in particular, the following observation:
268 U. S. 5, 45 Sup. Ct. 446, 69 L. Ed. 819.
249' U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214, 63 L. Ed. 493.'
24(1926) 269 U. S. 360, 46 Sup. Ct. 156, 70 L. Ed. 309.
22(1925)
2.3(1919)
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"The constitutionality of the Antinarcotic Act, touching which
this court so sharply divided in United States v. Dorems,25 was
not raised below and has not been again considered. The doctrine
27
approved in Hammer v. Dagenhart;26 Child Labor Tax Case;
2
s
Hill v. Wallace; and Linder v. United States,29 may necessitate
a review of that question if hereafter properly presented."
This most unusual judicial invitation to give the Court an opportunity to overrule a five-to-four decision produced prompt results. By questions certified by the circuit court of appeals the
broad question of the validity of the narcotic act was presented
in Nigro v. United States0 in 1928. In an opinion by Chief Justice Taft the act was again held valid. Mr. Justice Day's language
in the Doremus Case is quoted at length and with approval. The
chief justice then makes an interesting contribution. He refers
to the fact that by amendments passed in 1919 taxes imposed by
the narcotic act have been substantially increased. The dollar a
year levy of the original act has been replaced by rates of $24,
$12, or $6, and an excise has been placed on the sale of the drugs.
He then goes on to say:
"Thus the income from the tax for the government becomes
substantial. Under the Narcotic Act, as now amended, the tax
amounts to about one million dollars a year, and since the amendment in 1919 it has benefited the treasury to the extent of nearly
nine million dollars. If there was doubt as to the character of
this act as an alleged subterfuge, it has been removed by the
change whereby what was a nominal tax before was made a substantial one."
This wholly novel suggestion that constitutional vulnerability
of the Narcotic Act has been removed by increasing the rates of
the taxes levied does not seem logically relevant to the main issue
involved. It is not surprising that Mr. Justice McReynolds again
dissents in vigorous language, emphasizing that he can see no
relation between the broadly regulatory features of the statute and
the collection of revenue. It is certainly no answer to this objection to say that a good deal of revenue is coming in. If the act
is constitutional, it is because the police regulations set up bear
some rational relationship to the efficient collection of the taxes
imposed; and that relationship is the same whether the tax is a
25(1919)
26(1918)
27(1922)
28(1922)
29(1925)
30(1928)
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U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214, 63 L. Ed. 493.
U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101.
U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817.
.U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 822.
U. S. 5, 45 Sup. Ct. 446, 69 L. Ed. 819.
U. S. 332, 48 Sup. Ct. 388, 72 L. Ed. 600.
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dollar a year or a thousand dollars a year. Chief Justice Taft's
comment, quoted above, is obviously not intended to announce an
independent and exclusive test of the validity of the Narcotic Act;
but it seems rather to be thrown in by way of supplementary reinforcement. The judicial theory remains undisturbed that the
Harrison Act is valid because its drastic drug traffic control helps
the government collect its money. It is obvious that Congress
could, with some circumspection, build a substantial federal police
power upon the doctrines announced in the Narcotic Act cases.
5. Destructive or Regulatory Taxes May be Levied if "O
Their Face" They Are Revenue Measures-The Test of "Objective Constitutionality." We turn now to a group of federal
taxes which present much more difficult constitutional problems
than any thus far discussed. These are the taxes which have been
levied by Congress to control through regulatory or destructive
tax burdens matters wholly outside the scope of any delegated
federal power. They are not intended to raise revenue, and they
are not, like the state bank note tax and the protective tariff, taxes
which may be justified as exercises of other admitted congressional powers. If valid they place at the disposal of Congress an
implement for the effectuation of broadly national policies affecting the social and economic life of the nation.
The acts falling clearly within this group have not been
numerous. In 1902 Congress, under pressure from the powerful
lobby representing the dairy farmers of the'country, drove colored
oleomargaine out of the market by levying a prohibitive tax of
ten cents per pound upon its manufacture."1 In 1912 the "phossyjaw" match industry was destroyed by a tax of two cents per
hundred upon matches in which white, or poisonous, phosphorus
is used.3 2 At the same time through the successful diplomacy of
President Taft non-poisonous match patents were generously released to the industry, so that the complete abandonment of poisonous match-making was due as much to voluntary agreement as
to the impact of the tax. In 1919 Congress imposed a tax of
ten per cent upon the net incomes of establishments employing
children in violation of the standards set up in the act.33 This
was obviously designed to force the abandonment of child labor
throughout the country. In 1921 the Future Trading Act placed
SlAct of May 9, 1902, 32 Stat. at L. 193.
32
33 Act of April 9, 1912, 37 Stat. at L. 81.
Act of Feb. 24, 1919, 40 Stat. at L. 1057.
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a tax of twenty cents a bushel on contracts for the sale of grain
for future delivery except such sales as were made on boards
of trade operating under the detailed regulations set up in the
4
act and administered by the secretary of agriculture.1 Here are
four clear cases of the exercise by Congress of a definite and farreaching police power through the delegated authority to lay taxes.
The oleomargarine tax was held valid ;"6 the match tax was never
litigated; and the child labor and grain future taxes were declared
unconstitutional.3 6 These confusing and inconsistent results are
due to the use in these cases of two distinct judicial doctrines or
techniques employed in testing the validity of these statutes. These
may now be explained and analyzed.
In upholding the validity of the oleomargarine tax in McCray
v. United States,37 Mr. Justice White developed what may be
called the doctrine of "objective constitutionality" as applied to
federal taxing measures. He stated it as follows:
"Undoubtedly, in determining whether a particular act is within a granted power, its scope and effect is to be considered. Applying this rule to the acts assailed, it is self-evident that on their
face they levy an excise tax. That being their necessary scope
and operation, it follows that the acts are within the 'rant of
power. The argument to the contrary rests on the proposition
that, although the tax be within the power, as enforcing it will
destroy or restrict the manufacture of artificially colored oleomargarine, therefore the power to levy the tax did not obtain.
This, however, is but to say that the question of power depends,
not on the authority conferred by the constitution, but upon what
may be the consequence arising from the exercise of the lawful
authority."
It seems probable that at least four ingredients were compounded in Mr. Justice White's mind to produce this doctrine
that a tax measure must be held valid if "on its face" it levies a
tax. First, there is the general presumption of constitutionality
which attaches to all statutes; second, there are no constitutional
limits upon the mere rate of taxation; third, Congress has, and
must of necessity have, virtually unlimited discretion in the selection of the objects of taxation; and finally, it is no part of the
34

Act of Aug. 24, 1921, 42 Stat. at L. 187.
McCray v. United States, (1904) 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ci. 769, 49
L. Ed. 78.
36
Baileey v. Drexel Furniture Co., (1922) 259 U.- S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct.
449, 66 L. Ed. 817; Hill v. Wallace, (1922) 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453,
66 L. Ed. 822.
37(1904) 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78.
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judicial function to explore the motives which led Congress to
use a delegated power. This was all perfectly orthodox constitutional law, and furthermore, it led to a result which avoided the
highly embarrassing necessity of formulating a judicial test of
constitutionality whereby a tax of ten cents a pound on colored
oleomargarine could be held void, and a tax of ten cents a pound
on smoking tobacco could be held valid. Any such test would, in
White's judgment, involve the consideration by the Court of
legislative purposes and results not discernible in the text of the
act, and hence not properly within the range of judicial scrutiny.
The doctrine of "objective" constitutionality as applied to federal
taxing measures was a doctrine of judicial self-denial. It was
indeed very genuine self-denial for White, for we know that he
believed that Congress had exceeded its constitutional power in
passing the oleomargarine tax act, or any similar act, for in his
view the federal taxing power could validly be employed only for
revenue or for purposes safely within the scope of delegated
federal powers.38 But a tax thus "subjectively" unconstitutional
from the standpoint of the member of Congress was "objectively"
valid from the standpoint of the Supreme Court if it bore the earmarks identifying it as a revenue measure.
The judicial laissez faire theory of the McCray Case is eminently satisfactory to those who believe that the taxing power of
Congress ought to be available for the furtherance of any national
policy, or the solving of any national problem. It permits and
invites the direct and drastic regulation of social and economic
interests through repressive or destructive taxation. As long
as the proper label is attached to the act and the proper formula
is employed, the discretion of Congress as to the purposes to be
accomplished by the ostensible use of the taxing power seems to
be unlimited. If the power is abused, Congress alone is responsible. It is true that Mr. justice White includes in his opinion
his customary caveat that if a case arose in which the taxing
power was clearly being used "solely for the purpose of destroying rights which could not be rightfully destroyed consistently
with the principles of freedom and justice upon which the constitution rests" then the Court would be obliged to invalidate the
38
In the writer's earlier article, The National Police Power under the
Taxing Clause of the Constitution, (1920) 4 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
247 there is an extensive examination of White's views on this problem
as expressed by him in the Senate in 1892 in a debate on a taxing proposal
which he deemed "subjectively" bad, but "objectively" good.
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act. But this restriction is obviously directed only against palpable
and flagrant invasions of private right, and would hardly serve to
check the steady growth of a broad police power through federal
taxation. The McCray Case doctrine, in short, comes close to
making the validity of destructive and regulatory federal taxation
a "political question."
From the standpoint, however, of those who believe that there
should be some outside judicial restrictions upon the purposes for
which Congress uses its power of taxation, the doctrine of "objective constitutionality" is far from acceptable. As developed by
White it is logically none too satisfying. The validity of the taxing act is to be tested by the presence or absence of certain "objective" attributes in the statute which unmistakably brand it as a
revenue measure "on its face." If these are discovered, then the
act is valid. For reasons which are not made clear the Court
must ignore other objective attributes of the statute which quite
as plainly suggest that the measure is not a revenue measure. It
is one thing to say that the Court may not properly speculate as to
the motives which led Congress to put a tax of ten cents a pound
on colored oleomargarine, may not search the Congressional
Record to discover what Congress thought it was trying to do,
or may not examine evidence tending to prove that the levies will
bring in no revenue; it is quite a different thing to declare that
the Court may not rationally analyze the provisions of the act
and draw the obvious conclusion which needs no extraneous
evidence to support it, that this tax is completely destructive of
the business upon which it is imposed. The assumption that the
destructive purpose and effect of this tax cannot be plainly read in
the language of the statute itself, merely because some other tax
using the same rate is equally obviously not destructive, is clearly
contrary to fact. The Court, in other words, denies itself the right
to transfer its judicial gaze from the objective evidence that the
act is a revenue measure, and pay any attention to the equally
objective evidence that it is nothing of the sort. It insists upon
pretending to be ignorant of what every one else knows. The
doctrine, furthermore, has a certain inflexibility. It leaves no
room for the consideration of differences of degree. If the objective test is met, the Court must uphold the act, taking the bad with
the good no matter how much bad there is. It provides no technique for distinguishing between the statute which "on its face"
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levies a tax and at the same time exerts an incidental power of
repression or regulation of that which is taxed and the statute
which also levies a tax "on it face," as in the case of the oleo-:
margarine tax, and at the same time completely destroys its object.
There is a certain irony in the fact that White's test of "objective
constitutionality" is a really satisfactory measure of the validity
of federal taxing measures only for those who hold views as to
the scope and purposes of federal taxation which White himself
feared and detested. It was wholly to be expected that sooner
or later the Court would be led to evolve some judicial technique
for imposing more rigorous and definite limitations upon the destructive use of the federal power of taxation for the broad
purposes of social and economic control. Such a doctrine was
annofinced by Chief Justice Taft in the Child Labor Tax Case.3 9
6. Regulatory and Destructive Tax Levies May be Penalties
Rather than Taxes. When Is a Tax Not a Tax? The Child Labor
Tax of 1919 and the Future Trading Act of 1921 were held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on the same day, the former
in the case of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,40 and the latter in
Hill v. Wallace.4' The decision in each case rested upon the same
ground, namely, that what purported to be an exercise of the
power of Congress to tax was in reality not a tax at all, but the
imposition of a penalty, and that it was therefore not an exercise
of the delegated power of taxation or of any other delegated
power, and was consequently unconstitutional. In the Bailey Case
a ten per cent tax upon the net incomes of those employing children below specified ages was declared to be "on its face" a
penalty and not a tax. Chief Justice Taft's argument in support
of this conclusion emphasized four points. First, the amount of
the tax did not vary with the amount of the thing taxed. The
same tax was imposed upon the employer who hired a single child
for a day as upon the employer who hired a hundred or five
hundred children for a year. Each paid ten per cent of his total
net income. This certainly strongly suggests a punitive rather
than a fiscal purpose. Second, the tax is not imposed upon those
who unwittingly employ children below the lawful ages, but
only upon those who do so wilfully. This emphasis upon intent
30
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct.
449, 66 L. Ed. 817.
40(1922) 259 U. S.20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817.
4' (1922) 259 U. S.44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 822.
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is an attribute of a criminal law rather than a revenue measure.
Third, the statute sets up an elaborate code of regulation of conduct over which Congress admittedly has no direct authority,
and then imposes a severe fiscal burden upon those who deviate
from those regulations. Fourth, these regulations of conduct
are quite obviously the paramount and dominant features of the
act, constitute its obvious purpose, and cannot therefore be viewed
as instances of the merely incidental regulations which are commonly and permissibly associated with revenue measures. These
four characteristics spelled out a penal measure and not a tax.
It is apparent that the first two of these were present in the statute
rather fortuitously and were in no sense necessary to accomplish
the purpose of Congress to destroy child labor. They are not
likely to be common characteristics of taxing measures. It would
have been quite feasible to make the amount of the tax vary with
the amount of child labor employed, either by placing an ad
valorem levy upon all goods in the making of which children were
employed, or by taxing employers two dollars upon every day's
labor performed by children. It was also quite unnecessary to
exempt from the payment of the tax those who mistakenly and
in good faith employ children under the lawful age. In fact, state
child labor laws commonly place upon employers the burden of
seeing that they do not make these mistakes and hold them responsible if they do. Furthermore, these two attributes of the
child labor tax were not present in the Future Trading Act. In
that statute a tax of twenty cents a bushel was placed upon grain
sold on future contracts except upon boards of trade operating
under the regulations provided in the act. Quite obviously the
amount of the tax here does vary with the amount of the thing
taxed; nor is there any occasion or opportunity for exempting
any one from the payment of the tax because of his innocent intentions. The third and fourth characteristics of the child labor
tax mentioned above were, however, common to both statutes. In
each case the act itself outlined an elaborate body of regulations
not within the scope of any delegated federal power and then
exacted heavy payments from those violating those regulations.
And in each case these regulations, as unmistakably indicated in
the act itself, constituted the obvious and sole purpose of the
statute, and could not be mistaken by any rational person for
regulations reasonably incidental to the collection of revenue. It
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was in terms of these two attributes that Chief Justice Taft
formulated his answer to the question, "When is a tax not a tax ?,,12
There are several points about the "penalty" doctrine developed
in these two cases which deserve comment. In the first place,
the test of the validity of the alleged taxing measures lies in the
purpose and effect of the act as determined by all its provisions
sensibly construed, plus anything else which the Court may "know
judicially" in common with other rational men. This does not
involve an examination of legislative "motives" save as those
motives become translated into the purposes obviously expressed
in the language of the statute. A glance at the superficial earmarks indicating the purpose to raise revenue does not bar the
Court from examining and evaluating other evidences present in
the act that a wholly different purpose and effect are involved.
It seems clear that there may be no clearly described and ever
present characteristic which will inevitably brand an act as
"penal" rather than fiscal. Different statutes, as in the case of
the two before the Court, will present different kinds of evidence
that they impose penalties rather than lay taxes. The significance
of the rule laid down lies not so much in the kind of concrete
evidence of forbidden purpose which is found in any statute as
in the fact that the Court is willing to look for that evidence and
take it all into consideration.
In the second place, the "penalty" doctrine presents a flexible
test of the validity of this type of tax measure. It leaves room
for the recognition of differences of degree in the relative impact
of the penal and fiscal purposes disclosed in the language of the
statute itself. The mere presence of evidence of "objective constitutionality" is no longer conclusive as it was under White's
rule; nor is the presence of similar evidence of legislative purpose
to regulate or destroy deemed conclusive. The two kinds of
evidence are weighed the one against the other, and the Court
leaves itself free to uphold the act if the penal or regulatory
features are "reasonably incidental" to the fiscal purposes, or to
invalidate it if such penal or regulatory purposes are dominant or
exclusive. At some. point in the development of a police power
under the taxing clause Congress crosses the line which divides
42
For an acute analysis of these cases, see Thomas Reed Powell,
Child Labor, Congress and the Constitution, (1922) 1 The North Carolina
Law Review 61. See also Professor E. S. Corwin's briefer comment in
(1922) 16 The American Political Science Review 612.
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fiscal measures from those that impose penalties. It is a movable
line, and its precise location will depend upon a judicial judgment
as to the relative practical significance of the different ingredients
which went into the making of the statute, in other words, upon
a realistic appraisal of net results.
In the third place, the theory under discussion avoids the pitfalls, practical and logical, inherent in the doctrine which Professor E. S. Corwin has aptly named the doctrine of "dual federalism.

' 43

Reduced to its simplest terms this doctrine means that

Congress is limited in its use of its clearly delegated powers to
purposes and results which do not fall within the range of the
reserved powers of the states. As Corwin puts it, "The coexistence of the states and their powers is of itself a limitation
upon national power." This was the backbone of Mr. Justice
Day's opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart,44 invalidating the first
federal child labor law, though it was not the sole argument used.
The child labor law was void because it involved the use of the
commerce power in such a way as to impinge upon a range of
authority (to deal with child labor) reserved to the states by the
tenth amendment. The weakness of this doctrine has been ably
exposed by Professor Corwin and need not be discussed in detail
here. Its general result is to deny to Congress the right to
exercise its granted powers for broad national purposes; and it
is logically defective because the reserved powers of the states
which it is alleged may not be disturbed by the exercise of the
powers granted to Congress are by definition merely those powers
which have not been given to Congress or denied 'to the states.
If Congress is exercising a delegated power, then, by the very
language of the tenth amendment, it cannot possibly be exercising
a power reserved to the states. 45 Now while Chief Justice Taft
in the Bailey and Hill cases refers to Hammer v. Dagenhart with
approval, he does not apply this doctrine of "dual federalism."
The child labor and the grain future taxes are not held void because they are exercises of the federal power of taxation for
purposes reserved to the states, but because they are not taxes at
43
See his penetrating study, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce:
A Crucial Constitutional Issue, (1933) 18 Cornell Law Quarterly 477.
4-1(1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101.
45
See the able analysis of this point in Thomas Reed Powell, The
Child Labor Law, The Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause,
(1918) 3 Southern Law Quarterly 175, dealing with the first child labor

case.
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all. They are not taxes for bad purposes; they simply are not
taxes. Of course, if they are not taxes, then they are not exercises
of a power delegated to Congress and are void for that reason.
This is far more satisfactory analysis than that employed in
Hammer v. Dagenhart.
Finally it may be pointed out that Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co. and Hill v. Wallace do not overrule the McCray Case, and yet
the two groups of cases are logically irreconcilable. Chief Justice
Taft's reasoning in the child labor tax case and the grain futures
tax case leads inevitably to the conclusion that the oleomargarine
tax imposed a "penalty" rather than levied a tax and was therefore void. The logical application of the doctrine employed by
Mr. Justice White in the McCray Case to the child labor tax or
the grain futures tax would result in a finding of "objective constitutionality," based on the presence of attributes apparent on the
"face of the act," and would consequently compel the court to
hold the act valid. No amount of analysis will disclose any inherent differences between these various taxes which can provide
a logical basis for classifying them into different categories as to
their validity. There may be differences in degree; there may be
differences in the degree of judicial willingness to interfere with
legislative results; but there are no differences in kind.
The net result is that we have at present two available judicial
techniques for dealing with the validity of national police regulations under the taxing power. The criterion of "objective constitutionality," which may not inaccurately be called the doctrine of
"judicial obtuseness," permits the Court to uphold any carefully
drawn taxing statute designed to promote the social and economic
well-being of the country through regulation or repression by the
simple process of keeping the judicial eye discreetly on the portions
of the act which spell "tax" and discreetly off those which spell
"regulation and destruction." It may be invoked to sustain whatever degree of national police power under the taxing clause the
Supreme Court deems safe and desirable. It makes a strong
appeal to the Court by reason of its almost naive simplicity and
the character of the results which can be attained by its use. It
is not surprising to find the Court employing it in a very recent
case, Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,4 6 to uphold the validity of a
statute of the state of Washington imposing a tax of fifteen cents
46(U.S.

1934) 54 Sup. Ct. 599.
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a pound upon all butter substitutes. Mr. Justice Sutherland said:
"The statute here under review is in form plainly a taxing act,
with nothing in its terms to suggest that it was intended to be
anything else. It must be construed, and the intent and meaning
of the legislature ascertained, from the language of the act, and
the words used therein are to be given their ordinary meaning
unless the context shows that they are differently used."
All of which would, of course, be equally applicable to a
federal tax of fifteen cents a pound on all butter substitutes. It
is apparent that under the generous protection of the "objective
validity" doctrine the Court may permit Congress to employ its
taxing power for all broadly national purposes, as an implement
for the solution of national problems of social and economic
policy.
But when, in the judgment of the Court, this power has been
exercised too drastically, or pushed too far, and there is no precise
logical test by which it can be surely determined when this point
has been reached, then it may with equal ease shift over to the
"penalty" theory. It may look not merely at part of the statute
but at all of it, and may say as Chief justice Taft said in the
Bailey case,
"Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable.
All others can see and understand this. How can we properly
shut our minds to it ?" [as we did in the oleomargarine tax case] .4
And deciding not to shut its mind to it, it may announce that
the statute imposes a penalty, rather than levies a tax, and is
therefore void. Here then is an available check upon what the
Court deems an abuse by Congress of its police power derived
from taxation. The wide discretion which the Court enjoys in
determining which of the two doctrines it will apply to any given
exercise of the federal power of taxation for purposes of social
or economic control places it in a strategic position with respect to
national policy. If its decisions in the premises take on the aspect
of what we sometimes speak of as "judicial legislation," it is, at
least, judicial legislation of the conventional type with which we
have grown familiar through its presence in so many other parts
of our constitutional system.
47
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